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Abstract
There has been an ongoing cycle where stronger
defenses against adversarial attacks are subse-
quently broken by a more advanced defense-
aware attack. We present a new approach towards
ending this cycle where we “deflect” adversarial
attacks by causing the attacker to produce an in-
put that semantically resembles the attack’s target
class. To this end, we first propose a stronger de-
fense based on Capsule Networks that combines
three detection mechanisms to achieve state-of-
the-art detection performance on both standard
and defense-aware attacks. We then show that
undetected attacks against our defense often per-
ceptually resemble the adversarial target class
by performing a human study where participants
are asked to label images produced by the attack.
These attack images can no longer be called “ad-
versarial” because our network classifies them the
same way as humans do.
1. Introduction
Adversarial attacks have been the subject of constant re-
search since they were first discovered (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016). Most of this
research has been focused on the creation of more robust
models to defend against adversarial attacks (Song et al.,
2017; Madry et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2019; Goodfellow
et al., 2018), where the input image is correctly classified
as the original class rather than the adversarial target class,
as illustrated in Figure 1 (a). However, better defenses
have led to the development of stronger attack algorithms
to break these defenses (Madry et al., 2017; Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017b; Chen et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018). After
several iterations of creating and breaking defenses, some
research focused on adversarial attack detection (Grosse
et al., 2017; Feinman et al., 2017; Metzen et al., 2017; Lee
1University of California, San Diego 2Google Brain. Corre-
spondence to: Yao Qin <yaoqin@google.com>, Colin Raffel
<craffel@google.com>, Garrison Cottrell <gary@ucsd.edu>,
Geoffrey Hinton <geoffhinton@google.com>.
Under review by the International Conference on Machine Learn-
ing (ICML)
46
Clean Adversarial
Input
0 0
Classifier 0 0
(a) Defend
Clean Adversarial
Input
(b) Detect
Clean Adversarial
Input
(c) Deflect
Clean Adversarial Adversarial Adversarial
Human 0 0 0 8
Classifier 0 0 8 8
(a) Defend (b) Detect (c) Deflect
Figure 1. Different results of an adversarial attack against three
different defense approaches. The original class is 0 and the adver-
sarial target class is 8.
et al., 2018; Qin et al., 2020; Roth et al., 2019). Detection
algorithms aim to distinguish adversarial attacks from real
data and then flag the adversarial input, instead of attempt-
ing to correctly classify such inputs, as shown in Figure 1 (b).
However, this strategy fell into the same creating/b eaking
cycle: Many state-of-the-art methods (Roth et al., 2019;
Ma et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018) claiming to detect adver-
sarial attacks were broken shortly after publication with a
defense-aware attack (Hosseini et al., 2019; Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018). We attempt to get ahead
of this cycle by focusing on the deflection of adversarial
attacks, shown in Figure 1 (c): If the result of the adver-
sarial optimization of an image looks to a human like the
adversarial target class rather than its original class, then
the image can hardly be called adversarial anymore. We
call such attacks “deflected”. Some examples are shown in
Figure 2.
In this paper, we propose a network and detection mecha-
nism based on Capsule layers (Sabour et al., 2017; Qin et al.,
2020) that either detects attacks accurately or, for undetected
attacks, often pressures the attacker to produce images that
resemble the target class (thereby deflecting them). Our
network architecture is made up of two components: A
capsule classification network that classifies the input, and
a reconstruction network that reconstructs the input con-
ditioned on the pose parameters of the predicted capsule.
Apart from the classification loss and `2 reconstruction loss
used in (Sabour et al., 2017; Qin et al., 2020), we introduce
an extra cycle-consistency training loss which constrains
the classification of the winning capsule reconstruction to
be the same as the classification of the original input. This
new auxiliary training loss encourages the reconstructions
to more closely match the class-conditional distribution and
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Figure 2. Deflected adversarial attacks on the SVHN dataset.
These images were generated by a defense aware attack and the
maximal adversarial perturbation is bounded by 16/255.
helps the model detect and deflect adversarial attacks.
In addition, we propose two new attack-agnostic detection
methods based on the discrepancy between the winning-
capsule reconstruction of clean and adversarial inputs. We
find that a detection method that combines ours with the
one proposed by (Qin et al., 2020) performs best. We
show that this method can accurately detect white-box and
black-box attacks based on three different distortion metrics
(EAD (Chen et al., 2018), CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b)
and PGD (Madry et al., 2017)) on both the SVHN and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Following the suggestions in (Athalye
et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), we also propose
defense-aware attacks for our new detection method. We
find that our detection methods significantly outperform
state-of-the-art methods on defense-aware attacks. Finally,
we perform a human study to verify that many of the un-
detected adversarial attacks against our model have been
successfully deflected, i.e. adversarial images from both
defense-aware and standard attacks against our detection
mechanism are frequently classified as the target class by
humans. In contrast, successful attacks against baseline
models do not have this property. To summarize, our main
contributions are as follows:
• We introduce the notion of deflecting adversarial at-
tacks, which presents a step towards ending the battle
between attacks and defenses.
• We propose a new cycle-consistency loss which trains a
CapsNet to encourage the winning-capsule reconstruc-
tion to closely match the class-conditional distribution
and show that this can help detect and deflect adversar-
ial attacks.
• We introduce two attack-agnostic detection methods
based on the discrepancy between the winning-capsule
reconstruction of the clean and adversarial inputs, and
design a defense-aware attack to specifically attack our
detection mechanisms.
• We show through extensive experiments on SVHN and
CIFAR-10 that our detection mechanism can achieve
state-of-the-art performance in detecting white-/black-
box standard and defense-aware attacks.
• We perform a human study to show that our approach,
unlike previous methods, is able to deflect a large per-
centage of undetected adversarial attacks.
2. Network Architecture
In order to design a model that is strong enough to deflect
adversarial attacks, we build our network based on Cap-
sNet (Sabour et al., 2017). Figure 3 shows the pipeline of
our network architecture. The final layer of our classifier is a
Capsule layer (“CapsLayer” for short) which includes both
class capsules and background capsules. These capsules
are intended to encode feature attributes corresponding to
the class and the background respectively. Given an input
x, the output of a CapsLayer is a prediction f(x) and a
pose parameter v for all the classes and the background,
where vi denotes the pose parameter for class i. As in
the initial Capsules proposed in (Sabour et al., 2017), the
magnitude of the activation vector of a capsule encodes the
existence of an instance of the class and the orientation of
the activation vector encodes instantiation parameters of the
instance, such as its pose. Therefore, the magnitudes of the
capsules’ activations are used to perform classification while
the activation vector of the winning class capsule together
with the activation vectors of the background capsules are
used as the input to the reconstruction network. We use
r(vi=f(x)) and r(vi6=f(x)) to represent the reconstruction
from the winning capsule and a losing capsule respectively.
The reconstruction network uses the activations of all the
background capsules as well as the activation of one class
capsule but we omit this to simplify the notation. More
details of the network architecture used in this paper are
provided in Supplementary Material.
Cycle-consistent winning-capsule reconstructions The
CapsNet (Sabour et al., 2017) is trained with two loss terms:
a marginal loss for the classification and an `2 reconstruction
loss. To encourage the reconstruction to more closely match
the class conditional distribution and help the model detect
and deflect adversarial attacks, we additionally incorporate
an extra cycle-consistency loss `cyc which constrains the
reconstruction from the winning capsule to be classified as
the same class as the input, formulated as:
`cyc = `net(f(r(vi=f(x))), f(x)), (1)
where `net is the cross-entropy loss function and i ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n}, n denotes the number of classes in the dataset.
This can be achieved by feeding the reconstruction corre-
sponding to the winning capsule back into the classification
network, shown as the dotted red line in Figure 3. This extra
training loss together with our Cycle-consistent Detector
(introduced in Section 3) can help detect adversarial attacks.
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Figure 3. The network architecture with cycle-consistent winning capsule reconstructions.
In addition, since the winning-capsule reconstructions are
optimized to more closely match the class conditional data
distribution, it becomes easier for our model to deflect ad-
versarial attacks.
3. Detection Methods
In this paper, we use three reconstruction-based detection
methods to detect standard attacks. They are: Global
Threshold Detector (GTD), first proposed in (Qin et al.,
2020), Local Best Detector (LBD) and Cycle-Consistency
Detector (CCD).
Global Threshold Detector When the input is adversari-
ally perturbed, the classification given to the input may be
incorrect, but the reconstruction is often blurry and therefore
the distance between the adversarial input and the recon-
struction is larger than would be expected from normal input.
This allows us to detect the input as adversarial with the
Global Threshold Detector. This method, proposed in (Qin
et al., 2020), measures the reconstruction error between the
input and its reconstruction from the winning capsule. If the
reconstruction error is greater than a global threshold θ:
‖r(vi=f(x))− x‖2 > θ, (2)
then the input is flagged as an adversarial example.
Local Best Detector When the input is a clean image, the
reconstruction error from the winning capsule is smaller
than that of the losing capsules, where an example is shown
in the first row of Figure 4. This is likely because the `2
reconstruction objective only minimizes the reconstruction
from the winning capsule during training. However, when
the input is an adversarial example, the reconstruction from
the capsule corresponding to the correct label can be even
closer to the input compared to the reconstruction corre-
sponding to the winning capsule (see the second row in
Figure 4). Therefore, we propose the “Local Best Detector”
(LBD) to detect such adversarial images whose reconstruc-
tion error from the winning capsule is not the smallest:
arg min
j
‖r(vj)− x‖2 6= f(x), j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, (3)
where n is the number of classes in the dataset.
Cycle-Consistency Detector If the input is a clean image,
the reconstruction from the winning capsule will resemble
the input. Our model should ideally assign the same class
to the reconstruction of the winning capsule as the clean
input. This behavior is reinforced by training with the cycle-
consistency loss. For example, as shown in Figure 4 both
the clean input and its winning-capsule reconstruction are
classified as 4. However, when the input is an adversarial ex-
ample that is perceptually indistinguishable from the clean
image but pressures the model to predict the target class, the
reconstruction of the winning capsule often appears closer
to the clean input and/or is blurry. As a result, the recon-
struction of the winning capsule is often not classified as
the target class. As shown in Figure 4, the adversarial input
has been classified as the target class “3” while the recon-
struction corresponding to the winning capsule is classified
as “4”. Therefore, the Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD)
is designed to flag the input as an adversarial example if
the input x and its reconstruction of the winning capsule
r(vi=f(x)) are not classified as the same class:
f(r(vi=f(x))) 6= f(x). (4)
In this paper, we use these three detectors together to detect
adversarial examples. In other words, we flag any input as
adversarial if it’s classified as adversarial by any of the detec-
tion mechanisms. As a result, an adversarial input can only
go undetected if it passes all three detection mechanisms.
4. The Defense-Aware CC-PGD Attack
In order for an attack mechanism to generate an adversar-
ial example x′ = x + ∆ (where ∆ is a small adversarial
perturbation) that can both cause a misclassification and is
not detected by our detection mechanisms, the constructed
adversarial attack must:
• successfully fool the classifier: f(x′) = t and f(x) 6=
t, where t is the target class.
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Figure 4. An example of a clean input, an adversarial example generated via a PGD attack, and the reconstructions for the clean and
adversarial inputs from each class capsule. The reconstruction corresponding to the winning capsule is surrounded by a red box. Under
each reconstruction is its `2 reconstruction error; the smallest reconstruction error is highlighted in red. Both the clean input and
its winning capsule reconstruction are classified as ‘4’. The PGD attack is classified as the target class ‘3’ but its winning capsule
reconstruction is classified as ‘4’.
• avoid being detected by the Global Threshold Detector
(GTD), the attack needs to constrain the reconstruction
of the winning capsule to be close to the input.
• fool the Local Best Detector (LBD), the attack should
encourage the reconstructions from all the losing cap-
sules to be far away from the input to ensure the recon-
struction error of the winning capsule is the smallest.
• circumvent the Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD) by
fooling the classifier into making the target prediction
when it is fed the winning-capsule reconstruction of the
adversarial input, that is: f(r(vi=f(x′))) = f(x′) = t.
To generate such an attack, we follow (Qin et al., 2020) and
devise attacks which consist of two stages at each gradient
step. The first stage attempts to fool the classifier by follow-
ing a standard attack (e.g., a standard PGD attack) which
follows the gradient of the cross-entropy loss function with
respect to the input. Then, in the second stage, we focus on
fooling the detection mechanisms by taking the reconstruc-
tion error and cycle-consistency into consideration. This
can be formulated as minimizing the reconstruction loss `r,
which consists of three components: the reconstruction loss
corresponding to the Global Threshold Detector `g, the re-
construction loss corresponding to the Local Best Detector
`l and the cycle-consistency classification loss correspond-
ing to the Cycle-Consistency Detector `cyc. Specifically, the
reconstruction loss is defined as:
`r(x
′) = α1 · `g(x′) + α2 · `l(x′) + α3 · `cyc(x′)
= α1 · ‖r(vi=f(x′))− x′‖2
− α2 ·
∑n
k 6=f(x′)‖r(vk)− x′‖2
n− 1
+ α3 · `net(f(r(vi=f(x′))), f(x′))
(5)
where x′ = x+ ∆ is the adversarial example, n is the num-
ber of the classes in the dataset, ‖r(vi=f(x′))− x′‖2 is the
winning-capsule reconstruction error and ‖r(vk 6=f(x′)) −
x′‖2 is the losing-capsule reconstruction error. The hyperpa-
rameters α1, α2 and α3 are used to balance the importance
of attacking each detector. Then, the adversarial perturba-
tion can be updated in the second stage as:
∆← clip∞(∆− c · sign(∇∆(`r(x+ ∆))), (6)
where ∞ is the `∞ norm bound and c is the step size in
each iteration.
5. Experiments
Now that we have proposed our new defense model, we first
verify its detection performance on the SVHN and CIFAR-
10 datasets on a variety of attacks. Then, we use a human
study to demonstrate that our model frequently pressures
the undetected attacks to be deflected.
5.1. Evaluation Metrics and Datasets
In this paper, we use Accuracy to represent the proportion
of clean examples that are correctly classified by our net-
work. We use Success Rate to measure the performance of
an attack, which is defined as the proportion of adversarial
examples that successfully fool the classifier into making the
targeted prediction. In order to evaluate the performance of
different detection mechanisms, we report both False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR) and Undetected Rate. The False Positive
Rate is the proportion of clean examples that are flagged as
an adversarial example by the detection mechanism. The
Undetected Rate, first proposed in (Qin et al., 2020), denotes
the proportion of adversarial examples that successfully fool
the classifier and also go undetected. Finally, we perform a
human study in Section 6 in order to show that our model is
able to effectively deflect adversarial attacks.
5.2. Training Details and Test Accuracy
We set the batch size to be 64 and the learning rate to 0.0001
to train the network on SVHN. For CIFAR-10, the batch size
is set to be 128 and the learning rate is 0.0002. We use the
Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) to train all models.
The cycle-consistency loss `cyc is empirically multiplied
with 0.0005 before being added to the margin loss and the `2
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Figure 5. (a) The success rate of white-box PGD and CC-PGD changes as the number of iterations increases for our deflecting model on
CIFAR-10 dataset. (b) The success rate of white-box PGD and CC-PGD changes as ∞ increases for our deflecting model on CIFAR-10
dataset. (c) The Undetected Rate of the defense-aware attack CC-PGD optimized by a two-stage optimization and one-stage optimization
vs. False Positive Rate for the clean data on the CIFAR-10 dataset. (d) Ablation study for cycle-consistency loss. The Undetected Rate of
the defense-aware attack vs. False Positive Rate for baseline Capsule model trained without cycle-consistency loss and our deflecting
model on the CIFAR-10 dataset. GTD and LBD are used to detect adversarial examples in baseline Capsule model. GTD, LBD and CCD
are all used to detect adversarial attacks for our deflecting model.
reconstruction loss used as in the original CapsNets (Sabour
et al., 2017).
We test our deflecting models on the SVHN (Netzer et al.,
2011) and CIFAR-10 datasets (Krizhevsky, 2009). The clas-
sification accuracy on the clean test set is 96.5% on SVHN
and 92.6% on CIFAR-10, which show that our deflecting
models are reasonably good at classifying clean images.
5.3. Threat Model
In this paper, we consider two commonly used threat mod-
els: white-box and black-box. For white-box attacks, the
adversary has full knowledge of the network architecture
and parameters and is allowed to construct the adversarial
attack by computing the gradient of model’s output with
respect to its input. In the black-box setting, the adversary
is aware of the network architecture of the target model but
does not have direct access to the model’s parameters. To
generate the black-box attacks against the target model, a
substitute model that has the same network architecture is
trained and further attacked by the white-box attacks, which
are transferred to the target model as the black-box attacks.
5.4. Adversarial Attacks
Following the suggestions in (Carlini et al., 2019), we
test our attack-agnostic detection mechanisms on three
standard targeted attacks based on different distance met-
rics: `1 norm-based EAD (Chen et al., 2018), `2 norm-
based CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b), and `∞ norm-based
PGD (Madry et al., 2017). In addition, we follow the sugges-
tions in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) to report the performance
of our detection mechanisms against defense-aware attacks.
We use CC-PGD (described in Section 4) as our defense-
aware attack. For the `∞ norm-based attacks, we set the
maximal perturbation ∞ to be 16/255 on SVHN and 8/255
on CIFAR-10 as is typically used (Buckman et al., 2018;
Madry et al., 2017).
To generate EAD and CW attacks, we follow the previous
work (Chen et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) to set the
binary search steps to be 9, maximum iterations to be 1000
and learning rate to be 0.01. To construct `∞ norm-based
attacks (PGD and our defense-aware CC-PGD), we use a
step size 0.01 (2.55/255) in each iteration as (Madry et al.,
2017).
5.5. Sanity checks for PGD and CC-PGD attack
In this section, we perform basic sanity checks to ensure the
adversarial attacks are correctly implemented and our pro-
posed defense-aware CC-PGD is tuned well. In this section,
we test attacks against our proposed deflecting model on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. Similar conclusions also hold true on
the SVHN dataset.
Convergence of attacks. Figure 5 (a) shows the success
rate of white-box PGD and CC-PGD varies as the number
of iterations increases on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We can see
that the attacker has almost plateaued after 200 iterations.
Therefore, we set the total number of attack steps to be 200
in generating PGD and CC-PGD attack for efficiency.
100% success rate with non-constraint `∞ norm. In
Figure 5 (b), we show that the success rate of white-box
PGD and CC-PGD varies as the `∞ bound of the adversar-
ial perturbation ∞ increases. We can see that when ∞
is greater than 50/255, the success rate is 100%. However,
when ∞ is set to be 8/255 (which is typically used (Buck-
man et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017)), the attack success
rate against our deflecting model is below 50%.
Two-stage optimization To demonstrate the effectiveness
of our used two-stage optimization in generating defense-
aware CC-PGD, we compare the attack performance of
two-stage optimization introduced in Section 4 and a one-
stage optimization that uses a single loss function which
combines the cross-entropy loss to fool the classifier with
the reconstruction loss `r in Eqn. 7 to fool the detectors.
In Figure 5 (c), we construct the defense-aware CC-PGD
against our deflecting model on the CIFAR-10 dataset using
one-stage and two-stage optimization respectively. We can
see that the defense-aware CC-PGD attack that is optimized
by the two-stage optimization is slightly better than that
optimized by the one-stage optimization. Therefore, we
Deflecting Adversarial Attacks
Figure 6. The Undetected Rate of different detectors for white-box
attacks versus False Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input on the
SVHN dataset. “All” denotes GTD, LBD and CCD are all used
to detect adversarial attacks. The testing model is our deflecting
model. The better detection mechanism has a smaller FPR for
clean input and smaller undetected rate for attacks.
follow (Qin et al., 2020) to use the two-stage optimization
in all the following experiments to construct CC-PGD attack.
Hyperparameters Empirically, the hyperparameter α1,
α2 and α3 in Eqn. 7 are set to be 1, 0 and 20 respectively to
balance the importance among three detectors in generating
our defense-aware CC-PGD. Since the Cycle-Consistency
Detector is the most effective detector (discussed below in
Section 5.6.1), we assign a much higher weight to α3, which
controls the importance of attacking Cycle-Consistency De-
tection in generating our defense-aware CC-PGD attack.
In addition, we observe that increasing α2 (controlling the
importance of attacking the Local Best Detector) leads to
a decrease of the attack performance). Therefore, α2 is set
to be 0. This might result from the contradiction between
minimizing the winning-capsule reconstruction and maxi-
mizing the losing-capsule reconstruction, where they share
the background capsule information. Lastly, α1 is set to be
a very small value as 1 for the best attack performance for
CC-PGD.
The parameter that balances the importance of the two stages
in CC-PGD is empirically set to be 0.5 on SVHN and 0.75
for the first stage and 0.25 for the second stage on CIFAR-10.
More detailed results about selecting these hyperparameters
are shown in Supplementary Material.
5.6. Ablation Study
5.6.1. DETECTION METHODS
In this section, we study the effectiveness of our proposed
detection mechanisms: Local Best Detector (LBD) and
Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD) and compare them with
Global Threshold Detector (GTD) from (Qin et al., 2020).
Since the False Positive Rate (FPR) of clean input flagged by
the Global Threshold Detector (GTD) varies as the chosen
global threshold, in Figure 10 we plot the undetected rate of
white-box adversarial attacks flagged by different detectors
versus the False Positive Rate (FPR) of the clean input. The
global threshold θ is chosen from the range [0, 20] with a
step size of 0.4. We can clearly see that: 1) A single Global
Threshold Detector (GTD) proposed in (Qin et al., 2020)
is not enough to effectively detect adversarial attacks. 2)
In a standard PGD attack, the CCD is the most effective
detector at a low False Positive Rate, similar conclusions
on EAD and CW attacks shown in Supplementary Material.
3) In all the attacks, the combination of all three detectors
always performs the best. Therefore, we only report the
performance of the undetected rate of the combination of
all three detectors in the following experiments.
5.6.2. CYCLE-CONSISTENCY LOSS
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed cycle-
consistency loss, we construct a baseline Capsule model
that has the same network architecture as our deflecting
model but is trained without the extra cycle-consistency loss.
The False Positive Rate of the Cycle-Consistency Detector
on the CIFAR-10 test set is 33.46%, which represents that
33.46% of the clean test images are incorrectly flagged as
an adversarial example by the Cycle-Consistency Detector.
This means the Cycle-Consistency Detector is not suitable
for a model that is trained without cycle-consistency loss.
Therefore, to compare the detection performance between
the baseline Capsule model and our deflecting model, we
use a combined Global Threshold Detector (GTD) and Lo-
cal Best Detector (LBD) for the baseline Capsule model and
all three detectors for the deflecting model. The undetected
rate of the white-box defense-aware attack versus the False
Positive Rate (FPR) of the clean input on the CIFAR-10
dataset is shown in Figure 5 (d), where we can see that our
deflecting model together with all three detectors has a bet-
ter detection performance compared to the baseline model
trained without the cycle-consistency loss.
5.7. Detection of White-box Attacks
Before showing that our defense produces deflected attacks,
we must first validate that it improves detection performance.
Therefore, we test our model on standard and defense-aware
attacks and compare it with state-of-the-art detection meth-
ods in this section.
Standard attacks As shown in Figure 7, our detection
method has a very small undetected rate for all three stan-
dard white-box attacks (EAD, CW and PGD) on both the
SVHN and CIFAR-10 dataset. Among them, PGD is the
strongest attack against our detection mechanisms with the
highest undetected rates at the same FPR. For PGD attacks,
we achieve an undetected rate below 10% with a small False
Positive Rate on the SVHN dataset. The undetected rate
for white-box PGD is around 22% with the smallest False
Positive Rate on the CIFAR-10 dataset. These demonstrate
that our detection mechanism is very effective in detecting
standard white-box attacks that are based on different `p
norms.
Defense-aware attacks Following the suggestions
in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), we test our detection
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SVHN Dataset CIFAR10 Dataset
Figure 7. The Undetected Rate for white-box and black-box attacks versus False Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input on the SVHN and
CIFAR-10 datasets. The strongest attack has the largest area under the line.
Table 1. Success rate of the white-box and black-box attacks for our deflecting model.
Dataset EAD CW PGD CC-PGDWhite Black White Black White Black White Black
SVHN 100.0% 10.1% 97.6% 1.7% 96.0% 28.7% 69.0% 37.0%
CIFAR-10 100.0% 6.9% 78.0% 1.6% 49.3% 15.5% 46.8% 12.9%
Table 2. Comparison of the Undetected Rate of the state-of-the-art
detection methods on the CIFAR-10 dataset. For all the models,
the maximum `∞ perturbation is ∞ = 8/255 of the pixel dy-
namic range and the False Positive Rate of the clean input are 5%.
The best detection performance are highlighted in bold. (Smaller
numbers indicate better detection performance.)
Detection Method Statistical Classifier- Ours
Test based
CW 0.1% 0.0% 4.6%
Defense-aware PGD 97.8% 98.4% 28.9%
mechanism in the setting where the adversary is fully aware
of the defense (“defense-aware attacks”) using the CC-PGD
attack. Since the PGD attack is stronger than EAD and
CW in attacking our deflecting model (shown in Figure 7),
the first stage of our CC-PGD attack is to construct an
adversarial image via standard PGD and then, in the second
stage, take the reconstruction error and cycle-consistency
into consideration in order to fool the detection methods. In
Figure 7 we can clearly see the undetected rate of CC-PGD
increases compared to a standard PGD attack. However,
there is a significant performance drop in the success rate
of White-box CC-PGD (from PGD: 96.0% to CC-PGD:
69.0% on SVHN) as shown in Table 1. This indicates that
the adversary needs to sacrifice some success rate in order
not to be detected by our detection mechanism.
Comparison with State-of-the-Art Detection Methods
We compare our detection methods with the most recent
statistical test-based detection method (Roth et al., 2019)
and a classifier-based detection method proposed in (Hos-
seini et al., 2019). In Table 2, we can see that although the
statistical test (Roth et al., 2019) and the classifier-based
detection method (Hosseini et al., 2019) can detect standard
attacks successfully, they both fully fail against defense-
aware attacks 1. In contrast, our proposed reconstruction-
based detection mechanism has the best undetected rate in
detecting defense-aware adversarial attacks and a very small
undetected rate of 4.6% in detecting CW attacks.
5.8. Detection of black-box Attacks
To study the effectiveness of our detection mechanisms,
we also test our models on black-box attacks. In Figure 7
we can see that the undetected rate when the inputs are
black-box CC-PGD attacks is only half of that for white-
box CC-PGD on both datasets. The highest undetected
rate of a black-box attack is around 13% on the CIFAR-10
dataset, which demonstrates that our detection mechanism
can successfully detect black-box defense-aware attacks. In
addition, the great gap of the success rate between white-
box and black-box attacks shown in Table 1 indicates our
defense model significantly reduces the transferability of all
kinds of adversarial attacks.
6. Deflected Attacks
The numbers that we presented earlier in this paper have
implicitly assumed all adversarial attacks still resemble the
initial class, and therefore classifying them as the target
class would constitute a mistake. This assumption may not
be true in practice. We have discussed the ability of our
model to deflect adversarial attacks by having adversarial
gradients aligned with the class conditional data distribu-
tion, thereby making adversarial attacks resemble the target
class. To quantify these claims we need to evaluate human
performance on the adversarial attacks against our model.
1The numbers of statistical test and classifier-base detection in
the Table 2 are extracted from (Hosseini et al., 2019). Since the
success rate of the attacks are close to 100%, the undetected rate
is roughly (1 - True Positive Rate).
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Figure 8. The human study results on SVHN.
The maximal `∞ perturbation is 16/255.
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Figure 9. Deflected adversarial attacks on SVHN and CIFAR-10. The maximal `∞
perturbation is 16/255 for SVHN and 25/255 for CIFAR-10.
6.1. Human Study on SVHN
To validate our claim that our method can deflect adversarial
attacks, we performed a human study by using the Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk web service to recruit participants
and asked people to label SVHN digits. Each time, they
were shown a single image which was randomly sampled
from the following five different sets: 1) clean images from
the SVHN test set, 2) and 3) the undetected and successful
black-box and white-box PGD and CC-PGD adversarial at-
tacks against our deflecting model, 4) and 5) the successful
black-box and whilte-box PGD attacks generated to attack
a standard CNN classifier2. The maximal adversarial pertur-
bation of all the `∞ norm-based attacks are bounded by the
same ∞ = 16/255. The recruiters were asked to classify
each image as a digit between 0 and 9. If multiple digits
occurred in one image, we asked people to label the digit
closest to the center of the image. We did not limit the la-
belling time did not explain the purpose of this study to the
users other than it was a research study. In this way, we had
1500 images labeled in total and each image was labeled by
five different users. We then calculated the percentage of
uniformly labeled images that were classified as either the
original class or the adversarial target class. The results are
summarized in Figure 8.
We can see that 69.7% of successful and undetected black-
box attacks against our model were classified as the adver-
sarial target. This means that when our defense is attacked
with adversarial attacks generated within a standard `∞
bound, not only are the results visibly different than the
source image, they resemble the target class. In this way,
these attacks are successfully deflected and can hardly be
said to be adversarial, as the network is classifying them the
same way our human testers classified them. This is not the
case for the baseline CNN model, where only 14.3% of the
successful black-box PGD attacks were labeled as the target
class. In addition, compared to the white-box attacks, more
2The CNN classifier has the same network architecture as the
classification network in our deflecting model except that we re-
place the CapsLayer with a convolutional layer.
undetected and successful adversarial attacks generated un-
der the black-box setting are deflected to resemble the target
class. This suggests that to attack our deflecting model in a
more practical setting (black-box), the attack ends up being
deflected in order not to be detected, as shown in Figure 9.
6.2. Deflected Attacks on CIFAR-10
To show that our model can effectively deflect adversarial
attacks on the CIFAR-10 dataset, we have chosen a deflected
adversarial attack for each class with a maximal `∞ norm as
25/255, displayed in Figure 9. It is apparent that the clean
input has been perturbed to have the representative features
of the target class, in order to fool both the classifier and our
detection mechanisms. As a result, these adversarial attacks
are also successfully deflected by our model. Unlike SVHN,
for which human evaluators reliably classified the attacks as
the target label, the generated adversarial attacks against our
deflecting model on the CIFAR-10 do not reliably resemble
the target class, though they are much harder to identify than
the clean data.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a new approach that presents
a step towards ending the battle between defenses and at-
tacks by deflecting adversarial attacks. To this end, we pro-
pose a new cycle-consistency loss to encourage the winning-
capsule reconstruction of the CapsNet to closely match the
class-conditional distribution. With three detection mech-
anisms, we are able to detect standard adversarial attacks
based on three different distance metrics with a low False
Positive Rate on SVHN and CIFAR-10. To specifically at-
tack our detection mechanisms, we propose a defense-aware
attack and find that our model achieves drastically lower
undetected rates for defense aware attacks compared to state-
of-the-art methods. In addition, a large percentage of the
undetected attacks are deflected by our model to resemble
the adversarial target class, stop being adversarial any more.
This is verified by a human study showing that 70% of
the undetected black-box adversarial attacks are classified
unanimously by humans as the target class on SVHN.
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Appendix
A. Model Architectures
The details of the network architecture for SVHN (Netzer
et al., 2011) and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) datasets are
shown in Table 3 and Table 4.
B. Ablation Study for Detection Methods
In Figure 10, we show the undetected rate of white-box
EAD (Chen et al., 2018) and CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b)
attacks flagged by different detectors versus the False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR) of the clean input. The combination of three
detectors always works the best in detecting adversarial
examples.
Figure 10. The Undetected Rate of different detectors for white-
box attacks versus False Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input on the
SVHN dataset. “All” denotes GTD, LBD and CCD are all used
to detect adversarial attacks. The testing model is our deflecting
model. The better detection mechanism has a smaller FPR for
clean input and smaller undetected rate for attacks.
C. Hyperparameters
As introduced in Section 4 in the main paper, we construct
the defense-aware CC-PGD attack via minimizing the re-
construction loss, which is defined as:
`r(x
′) = α1 · `g(x′) + α2 · `l(x′) + α3 · `cyc(x′)
= α1 · ‖r(vi=f(x′))− x′‖2
− α2 ·
∑n
k 6=f(x′)‖r(vk)− x′‖2
n− 1
+ α3 · `net(f(r(vi=f(x′))), f(x′))
(7)
where x′ = x+ ∆ is the adversarial example, n is the num-
ber of the classes in the dataset, ‖r(vi=f(x′))− x′‖2 is the
winning-capsule reconstruction error and ‖r(vk 6=f(x′)) −
x′‖2 is the losing-capsule reconstruction error. The hyperpa-
rameters α1, α2 and α3 are used to balance the importance
of attacking each detector. We set α1 = 1 and then show
the attack performance when we change α2 (see Figure 11
(a)) and α3 (see Figure 11 (b)).
We can see that when we set α2 = 0, the attack performance
is the best (higher undetected rate at a low False Positive
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Figure 11. The undetected rate of our white-box defense-aware
CC-PGD attack versus False Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input
on the CIFAR-10 dataset when we change the hyperparameter
α2 in (a) and hyperparameter α3 in (b). These hyperparameters
control the importance of attacking each detector in Eqn. 7.
Rate). In addition, the attack performance of our CC-PGD
is not sensitive to the hyperparameter α3. Therefore, we
simply set α3 = 20, which is slightly better at a low False
Positive Rate.
D. Examples of Adversarial Attacks and
Reconstructions
We display successful adversarial attacks but detected by
our detection mechanism, and display all the reconstructions
when the input are EAD attacks (on the left) and CW attacks
(on the right) in Figure 12, PGD attacks (on the left) and
our CC-PGD attacks (on the right) in Figure 13 for the
SVHN dataset. We also show the successful and detected
adversarial EAD attacks (on the left) and CW attacks (on
the right) in Figure 14, PGD attacks (on the left) and our
CC-PGD attacks (on the right) in Figure 15 for CIFAR-10
dataset.
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Table 3. The network architecture for the SVHN dataset.
Layer Name Configurations
Classification
Network
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x4, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x8, stride size: 1x1,
activations: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x2, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x4, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x1, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x2, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
CapsLayer
number of input capsules: 16, input atoms: 512,
number of output capsules: 25, output atoms: 4,
number of dynamic routing: 1
Reconstruction
Network
fully connected input size: 100, output size:1024
fully connected input size: 1024, output size:16384
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 64, stride size: 2x2
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 32, stride size: 2x2
conv
filter size: 4x4 number of filters: 3, stride size: 1x1,
activation: sigmoid
Table 4. The network architecture for the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Layer Name Configurations
Classification
Network
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x4, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x8, stride size: 1x1,
activations: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x2, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x4, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x1, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x2, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
CapsLayer
number of input capsules: 16, input atoms: 512,
number of output capsules: 25, output atoms: 8,
number of dynamic routing: 1
Reconstruction
Network
fully connected input size: 200, output size:1024
fully connected input size: 1024, output size:16384
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 64, stride size: 2x2
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 32, stride size: 2x2
conv
filter size: 4x4 number of filters: 3, stride size: 1x1,
activation: sigmoid
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Figure 12. Successful but detected adversarial EAD attacks (on the left) and CW attacks (on the right) and the corresponding capsule
reconstructions on SVHN. The first column is the clean input, the second column is the adversarial example, the third column is the
winning-capsule reconstruction, the last ten columns are the reconstructions corresponding to class 0 to 9.
Figure 13. Successful but detected adversarial PGD attacks (on the left) and our CC-PGD attacks (on the right) and the corresponding
capsule reconstructions on SVHN. The first column is the clean input, the second column is the adversarial example, the third column is
the winning-capsule reconstruction, the last ten columns are the reconstructions corresponding to class 0 to 9. The maximal `∞ bound to
the adversarial perturbation is 16/255.
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Figure 14. Successful but detected adversarial EAD attacks (on the left) and CW attacks (on the right) and the corresponding capsule
reconstructions on CIFAR-10. The first column is the clean input, the second column is the adversarial example, the third column is the
winning-capsule reconstruction, the last ten columns are the reconstructions corresponding to class 0 to 9.
Figure 15. Successful but detected adversarial PGD attacks (on the left) and our CC-PGD attacks (on the right) and the corresponding
capsule reconstructions on CIFAR-10. The first column is the clean input, the second column is the adversarial example, the third column
is the winning-capsule reconstruction, the last ten columns are the reconstructions corresponding to class 0 to 9. The maximal `∞ bound
to the adversarial perturbation is 8/255.
